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ARGUMENT 
I. IF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WIN THIS APPEALS CASE, 
THEN FUTURE DEFENDANTS WILL NOT NEED TO RESPOND 
TO PERSONALLY SERVED SUMMONSES OR NOTICES OF HEARING 
ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND MAY WAIT UNTDL AFTER 
JUDGMENT IS ISSUED AGAINST THEM, EVEN WHERE 
THEY HAVE NO EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, AND THEN 
SIMPLY MOVE TO SET ASIDE - A RULE OF LAW 
WHICH WOULD CLEARLY CONTRADICT THE MEANING 
AND INTENT OF THE CHANDLER WATVABBLITY STANDARD. 
If the Defendants-Appellees are allowed to have this judgment set aside, then the rule of 
law will become such that any defendant can simply ignore personally served summons, ignore 
notices of hearing on default judgment, and ignore the entire judicial process, and then at some 
point after default judgment is entered, i.e. when any collection effort is made, they will be able to 
simply file a motion to set aside, not even based upon excusable neglect, and get the judgment set 
aside. Clearly, this would be the end of the Chandler rule that arbitration clauses are waivable, 
see Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), and indeed would incentivise 
defendants to do nothing in response to summons - why do anything at all when a motion to set 
aside is available in the end game? This is contrary to the established rule of law, namely the 
Chandler rule, that defendants who do not assert the defense of arbitability waive that right. See 
id. 
1 
EL THE POINT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION RULE IS TO EXCUSE 
DEFENDANTS WHO DO NOT IMMEDIATELY RAISE ARBITRATION, BUT WHO 
DO SO BEFORE SUBSTANTIALLY PARTICIPATING IN THE LITIGATION. 
THE SUBSTANTIAL PARTICIPATION RULE SHOULD NOT BE MISUSED TO 
JUSTIFY A DEFENDANT WHO NEVER APPEARS AND DEFENDS ITSELF AT ALL, 
NEVER RAISES ARBITRATION, IGNORES A PERSONALLY SERVED SUMMONS 
AND THE HEARING ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ALLOWS DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED AGAINST IT WITHOUT EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
Chandler's substantial participation rule allows Courts to order arbitration even where a 
defendant fails to raise arbitration right away, e.g. in its answer, but nonetheless does so during 
the litigation, prior to substantially participating therein. Defendants-Appellees would have this 
court misuse and misapply this rule to excuse a defendant who ignores personal service, fails to 
respond, fails to attend the hearing on default judgment, and does nothing until after judgment has 
been entered against him - a fact pattern wholly foreign to the facts in Chandler, and categorically 
different; defendants should be required to raise arbitration or else be found to have waived it -
this is the fundamental holding of Chandler; to ignore legal proceedings and only raise the issue 
after final judgment, and to nonetheless be allowed under a manipulation of the substantial 
participation rule, to toss out everything that occurred until the motion to set aside was belatedly 
made, would be to vitiate the fundamental waiver rule. Furthermore, it would elevate defaulters -
indeed defaulters with no excusable neglect basis for a set aside motion - above those who 
respond to the suit and yet raise the arbitration defense late in that litigation, rewarding the 
defendant that wholly ignored the litigation with a set aside and penalizing the defendant that 
responded to the summons and appeared and defended themselves. 
In other words, people that acted late in the game would be penalized while those that 
acted only after the game was over would be rewarded. The wavier and substantial participation 
2 
rules would thus become irrational and internally inconsistent. Such a proposed legal scheme 
should be rejected. 
IIL IF DEFAULTERS ARE TO BE ALLOWED TO AVOID THE WAVIER RULE 
AND THUS TO RAISE ARBITRATION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A SET ASIDE 
MOTION, IT SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE WHO ALSO BASE THEIR SET 
ASIDE MOTION ON EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
Perhaps defaulters who defaulted because of excusable neglect should be able to have the 
judgment set aside and thus to raise arbitration. But that is not this case. This case is one in 
which the defendants moved to set aside solely on the basis of arbitration, and not on the basis of 
excusable neglect. Such defendants fairly and justly come within the Chandler waiver rule - they 
failed to raise arbitration in the litigation, and the litigation was concluded while they chose to sit 
in default. There is no unfairness in enforcing the waiver rule in this case, and indeed, as argued 
above, failing to enforce the waiver rule in this case would leave a waiver rule which would be 
either wholly vitiated or else rendered completely irrational as it applied defaulting defendants 
versus defendants who appear and defend and belatedly assert arbitration. 
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS RATHER THAN FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE IN 
QUESTION, THUS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DENOVO. 
Appellant is not asking this court to review determinations of facts. Indeed there are no 
facts in dispute. Rather, appellant is asking this Court only to review the appropriate application 
of the legal standard for determining waiver of contractual arbitration rights where a party, 
personally served, has defaulted and failed to appear and defend itself at a hearing or in response 
to plaintiffs affidavits submitted thereafter, and allows default judgment to be entered, and only 
then moves to set aside - not based upon excusable neglect, but merely upon the basis of a 
belated, post-judgment invocation of a contractual arbitration clause. Again, the facts are not in 
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dispute; the question is legal in nature: whether a party under these undisputed facts has waived 
its contractual arbitration right under Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 
1992). Thus the operative standard in this matter is de novo. See Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 
356, 360 (Utah 1992). 
Even if the standard is abuse of discretion, the arguments set forth above clearly establish 
that the only logical and consistent application and rule of law for the waiver standard to govern 
arbitration motions is one under which defaulters, who were personally served and who failed to 
raise excusable neglect, are to be held to have waived arbitration. 
V. VAGUE ACCUSATIONS OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT ARE NOT WELL 
TAKEN IN THIS CASE AND DO NOT PERTAIN TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
REGARDLESS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS CONDUCTED ITSELF IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH EQUITABLE STANDARDS. 
Defendants-Appellees argue that Plaintiff-Appellant's arguments should not prevail 
because of equity. Such a "clean hands" argument is inapposite in this case; this case presents 
questions as to the proper standard for detennining whethet a defei idant should be allowed to 
raise an arbitration clause for the first time in a set aside motion based not upon excusable neglect 
but rather only on the existence of a contractual arbitration clause. Furthermore, and regardless 
of Defendants-Appellees' invoking of equitable issues, Plaintiff-Appellant has acted equitably and 
ethically in this matter; it personally served Defendants, held a hearing on the propriety of default 
judgment, submitted affidavits regarding that propriety, and secured a judgment from the coi irt. 
These actions comport wholly with equitable conduct and provide no basis for any kind of "clean 
hands" argument, even if such argument were relevant. 
4 
VI THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL. 
The district court's order which is appealed herein was not a final order. This Court 
already considered Defendants-Appellee's arguments to the contrary as they were asserted in 
opposition to Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Leave to file an Interlocutory Appeal, prior to this 
Court's granting of leave to file this interlocutory appeal. The simple but fatal flaw in 
Defendants-Appellees' repeat argument on this point is the truth that the district court's order 
merely sets aside the judgment and "orders the parties to arbitrate; it did not dismiss the case. The 
order, which is set forth in the Addendum to Plaintiff-Appellant's opening brief, speaks for itself 
in this regard, and plainly does not do what Defendants-Appellees' jurisdictional argument claims 
it does (i.e. enter a final order dismissing the case). 
"I II PREJUDICE IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IS ('LEA R. 
The setting aside of the default judgment clearly prejudices Plaintiff-Appellant. As it 
stood prior to the granting of the set aside motion, Plaintiff-Appellant possessed a sizable 
judgment against Defendants-Appellees, awarding it damages for Defendants-Appellees' breaches 
of contract. Upon the granting of the set aside motion, Plaintiff-Appellant is set back to square 
one, has no judgment, and must start over in the pursuit of this matter. This constitutes prejudice. 
Furthermore, this was not a simple default process. Plaintiffs first went to the effort and expense 
of having Defendants personally served in California. They then submitted default pleadings, and 
the Court asked for a hearing, which Plaintiff attended and participated in, while Defendants did 
not. The Court then had Plaintiffs submit affidavits to further support its petition for default 
judgment. Only after having effectuated personal service, submitting default pleadings, 
participating in the hearing, and preparing and filing the additional affidavits, did the Court grant 
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default judgment. All the effort and expense of these actions would be rendei eel meaningless and 
wasted if the granting of the motion to set aside stands - this is additional prejudice to Plaintiff-
Appellant. 
Indeed, if Defendants-Appellees were able to secure affirmation of the set aside order 
below in this case, based upon the prejudice issue, then indeed no plaintiff in the same setting 
would likely be able to establish prejudice. In a default setting such as this - where the defendant 
has been personally served, ignored the summons, ignored the hearing, ignored the process, and 
moved only after judgment for set aside based only upon a never-before raised arbitration clause -
there is little if anything else that a plaintiff could have invested into the pi oeess so as to constiti ite 
additional lost and wasted efforts constituting prejudice. Such a plaintiff has put forth everything 
he could be required to put forth in a default setting: fulfillment of personal service requirements, 
the holding of the hearing, the submission of additional affidavits, and the submission and securing 
of the default judgment. No additional efforts could be expended and thus wasted, and nothing 
more could, be done and thus lost, so as to have a case with an increased level of prejudice If 
Defendants-Appellee's argument that there is no prejudice here is to be adopted and the order 
below affirmed based thereon, then the issue of waiver of arbitration in settings such as this 
becomes moot, since the such a prejudice standard would be essentially unattainable. The more 
rational and logical ruling is to find prejudice in the loss of the judgment and in the wasted time 
effort and expense of the process required to secure such judgment and thereby to follow-
through with the waiver rule as should be substantively applied in this case. When a defendant 
has chosen to ignore personal service, chosen to ignore the hearing set to consider default 
judgment, allowed the process as it continue forward thereafter, and allowed default judgment to 
be entered against it, and only thereafter appeared and moved to set aside not based on excusable 
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neglect but only based upon a never-before raised nor asserted contractual arbitration 
clause, such a defendant should be held to have waived its arbitration right. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore Plaintiff-Appellant asks the Court to reverse the district court's order setting 
aside the judgment and ordering arbitration, thereby upholding a consistent and internally logical 
waiver standard under Chandler and requiring defendants (who lack excusable neglect) to appear 
and raise arbitration during the pendency of the litigation, and thereby rejecting the belated (and 
unexcused by neglect) raising of arbitration rights by defendants who ignore personal summonses, 
ignore default hearings, and ignore the process leading to the court's entry of default judgment 
against them. 
Dated this 7th day of July, 2003, 
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES 
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I hereby certify that on this the 7* day of July, 2003,1 did cause two copies of the 
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Michael D. Hughes 
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187 North 100 West 
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